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1. INTRODUCTION

One of the most fundamental cognitive acts is the attribution of a probability p(S) to a statement S, for example, the attribution of .7 probability to
the claim that the economy will weaken next year. We may distinguish four
ways in which people produce such attributions.
1. Relative Frequency. Having observed a sample of m individuals, n of
which have a certain property, it is common to ascribe probability n/m
to the statement that another individual drawn from the same population will also possess the given property. A large literature testifies to
the fact that people often rely in this way on relative frequency as a
guide to probability, even in the absence of random sampling (see Estes,
1976 for a review).
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2.

Principles of Symmetry. Given one face of a cubical and homogeneous
die, it is natural to assign probability l/6 to the statement that this face
will turn up after a vigorous role. Such an intuition is based on the symmetry of the die and on some version of the doctrine of “insufficient
reason.”
(For justification
and extension of this doctrine see Jaynes,
1979. Myers & Osherson, in press, offer discussion from a psychological point of view.)
3. Derivation from Preestablished Probabilities.
People often attempt to
deduce desired probabilities from probabilities antecedently attributed
to statements, for example, using Bayes’ theorem. Such mental deductions presuppose an inference procedure, perhaps implicitly held, and
perhaps deviant from the viewpoint of classical probability theory. A
considerable body of psychological research has been devoted to characterizing the inference procedures that underlie derivations
of this
kind. (See Baron, 1988 for a review.)
4. Default Reasoning. If a desired probability cannot be ascertained using
the foregoing methods, it is necessary to rely on reasoning schemas of a
nonprobabilistic
kind, involving causal inference and similarity. Collins
and Michalski (1989) examined a variety of schemas of this kind, but
did not connect them to probability estimation per se.
This article addresses default reasoning about probability.
In particular,
we consider judgments about the (conditional)
probability
of statements
concerning mammals, given the truth of other statements. A similaritybased model of such reasoning is advanced and evaluated against judgments
elicited from undergraduates.
Although numerous schemes have been advanced for reasoning by similarity (see Vosniadou & Ortony, 1989), there
appear to be no proposals for converting similarity into specific probabilities. A successful method of this kind would be a contribution
not only to
psychology, but also to artificial intelligence inasmuch as it would help to
isolate analogical processes in automated reasoning, focusing them solely
on default probabilities. Inference can then be carried out within the framework of classical probability theory. (See Pearl, 1988, Section 1.4, for the
advantages of this strategy in automated inference.)
Our goal is limited to showing the feasibility of converting similarity into
probability,
rather than advancing the definitive similarity model. Consequently, we shall attempt to demonstrate the predictive power of a simple
model of this kind, treating more complex alternatives cursorily. Although
our model is based primarily on similarity, we do not deny the importance
of causal schemas and other nonsimilarity
mechanisms in probabilistic
reasoning. (See Collins & Michalski,
1989 for discussion of many such principles.) Indeed, by assessing the strengths and weaknesses
of similarity
approaches to default probability,
the role of nonsimilarity
mechanisms
may be expected to emerge more clearly.

DEFAULT

PROBABILITY

253

The underlying idea of our model can be conveyed as follows. Suppose
that objects 01. . . on each have property P, and that none of 0,‘. . . oh have P.
Then, in the absence of other information,
the probability that some new
object o has P is assumed to vary directly with the similarity of o to 01. . . on
and inversely with the similarity of o to or’. . .oh. Several principles are
needed in order to make this idea precise. For the case in which all the objects are at the same hierarchical level, we need principles that determine (a)
the similarity between pairs of objects; and (b) the amalgamation
of multiple, pairwise similarities into an overall judgment. For the case in which
objects are at different hierarchical levels, we need additional principles that
determine (c) the decomposition of higher-level objects into lower-level ones.
Principles relevant to (b) and (c) will be derived from the theory of category-based induction advanced in Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez, & Shafir
(1990). Knowledge of the latter theory is not presupposed here, however,
because the needed principles will be introduced later. With regard to (a),
we rely on a feature-based conception of similarity. Given mammals ml, m2
with feature sets MI, M2, the similarity of ml to mz is taken to be:
(1)

sim(ml,

m2)

=

Mlf-lM2
MlUM2

This model has a long history in psychology and biology (see Gregson,
1975, Section 2.5). Its accuracy in this context is documented in a separate
experiment reported later.
We now overview the empirical studies used to test the model. All the
studies center on 48 mammals, chosen for familiarity and diversity; they are
listed in Table 1. Eighty-five properties were selected to represent common
knowledge about the 48 mammals. Abbreviations for the properties are listed
in Table 2 (p. 254), and sample properties are given in unabbreviated form
in Table 3 (p. 254). Subjects always worked with unabbreviated properties;
the abbreviations are for expositional ease. With the exception of animal
noises (bleating, roaring, etc., essentially unique to each animal), no other
property was listed by more than a single subject from a group of 10 MIT
TABLE

1

Mammals
antelope
bat

deer
dalmation

beaver
blue whale
bobcat

fox
german

horse
humpback
shepard

buffalo
chihuohua

giont
giroffe
gorilla

pando

chimpanzee
collie
eleohant

grizzly
bear
hamster
h’ lppopotomus

leopard
lion
killer

persian
whale

whale

pig
polar
robbit

mole
moose

raccoon
rot
seal

mouse
otter

sheep
Siamese

OX

skunk

cat
bear

spider
squirrel
tiger
walrus
weasel
rhinoceros
wolf
zebra

cat

monkey
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TABLE
Abbreviated
black
red
hairless

white
yellow
toughskin

flippers
longleg
horns

hands
toil
claws

swims
weak

tunnels
muscular

nocturnal
eats vegetation

hibernates
eats insects

skimmer
desert
mountains

stalker
bush
ocean

fierce
domesticated

timid

black:
longleg:
chewteeth:
vegetation:

SMITH

2
Prooerties
brown

gray

oronge

patches
big
hooves

spots
small
pads
meatteeth

stripes

furry
lean
longneck
strainteeth

bulbous
paws

smelly
fast

buckteeth
flys
slow

bipedol
agile

quadrupedal
eats fish

active
eats

forager
newworld

grazer
oldworld
forest

hunter
arctic
fields

water

tree

group

solitary

plains
ground
smort

TABLE

bulbous:

AND

blue

chewteeth
tusks
walks

Somole.

STOB,

inactive
eats plonkton

meat

scavenger
coastal
jungle
cave
nestpot

3

Unabbreviated

Prooerties

the color
black
in its visual
having
o roundish
or bulky
hoving
a long
leg
having
molars
that ore
commonly
eats vegetation

good

appearance
body
shape
for chewing
in its natural

habitat

newworld:
agility:
swims:

living
in the New World
(North
and South
hoving
o high degree
of physical
coordination
swimming
as a means
of locomotion

ocean:
nestspot:

living
keeping

in the ocean
their
young

hops
strong

in a designated,

America)

enclosed

orea

students asked to supply properties of mammals. Moreover, none of the 85
properties were judged to be inappropriate by more than 1 student in the
same group. These pilot studies, along with the coherence of the results
reported later, suggest that the 85 properties capture common knowledge
about familiar mammals.
Three rating tasks were performed in this study, each employing a separate group of subjects. The first task measured the strength of association
between each of the 48 mammals and each of the 85 properties. The second
task obtained similarity ratings between pairs of mammals. The third task
focussed on probability judgment. The property-rating task is described in
Section 2. Its purpose was to build a database of mammal facts from which
similarity between mammals could be calculated. The ability to predict similarity on this basis is tested in the similarity task, described in Section 3. The
probability task is described in Section 4. Its purpose was to assess different
methods for generating default probabilities by comparing generated prob-
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abilities with the actual judgments of our subjects. Ideally, every subject
would have rated every mammal on every property, and also completed the
similarity and probability tasks. In practice, it was decided that subjects
should work for no more than an hour, participating
in just one of the
tasks. This procedure minimizes fatigue and the risk of contaminating judgments in one task by recollection of another. On the other hand, the accuracy of our analyses are thereby limited by the effects of between-subject
variability, as will be pointed out later.
The methods and results of the three tasks are now described. All subjects were MIT undergraduate volunteers, recruited through advertisements
and paid for their participation.
2. PROPERTY-RATING

TASK

2.1 Method

Subjects first reviewed the list of 48 mammals and 85 properties (unabbreviated). It was explained that a nonnegative number was to be assigned to
each mammal-property
pair; the number should reflect “the relative strength
of association between the property and the mammal.”
No upper bound
was imposed on these ratings. Subjects were also told to expect that many of
the properties would be negligibly associated with many of the mammals. A
rating of 0 was to be used for these cases.
Each subject worked for 1 hour, evaluating lo-15 randomly chosen
mammals on all 85 properties (faster subjects evaluated more mammals).
For each mammal evaluated, all the properties were rated for that mammal
before the next mammal was introduced. Properties were rated in the order
given in Table 2 (each row read from left to right). A computer terminal was
used to present properties and record data. Subjects worked individually at
their own speed and had the opportunity to review and revise their prior
ratings at any time. Twenty-nine subjects participated in the property-rating
task. Random sampling of the mammals was constrained so that each mammal was evaluated by 8 or 9 subjects.
2.2 Results

So that averages would not be biased by those subjects using large numbers,
every subject’s ratings were individually normalized by a linear transformation to range from a lowest score of 0 to a highest score of 1. For each mammal, the normalized scores of the 8 or 9 subjects rating it were averaged.
The result is a 45 x 85 matrix whose i, j-cell approximates the degree to
which property j is associated with mammal i in the minds of MIT undergraduates. Henceforth this matrix will be denoted by M. The ith row of A4
corresponds to the ith mammal of the 48 used in the study; this mammal
will be denoted by mi.
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The following statistics provide some information
about the variability
of the ratings for the different mammals. The overall association to mi is
defined as
.qi , M(i, j).
The average overall association to the 48 mammals is 17.76 (SD = 2.63). The
number of nontrivial associations to m; is defined to be the number ofjl85
such that M(i, j) 2 .l. The average number of nontrivial associations to the
48 mammals is 41.9 (SD = 5.64).
3. SIMILARITY

TASK

3.1 Method

To test the psychological reality of similarity model (1) as well as the intersubject stability of our Mammal x Property matrix, 30 subjects were asked
to rate the similarity of pairs of mammals drawn from the initial stock of
48.’ None of the 30 subjects had participated in the property-rating task.
The following instructions were employed:
This experiment concerns your judgment about the biological similarity of
different mammals. The similarity of two mammals depends on how alike they
are in physiology, anatomy, diet, behavior, habitat, appearance, etc. For each
pair of mammals that is presented, you will assign a value between 0 and 100
(decimals allowed) that reflects the similarity that you perceive between the
mammals mentioned in the pair. Numbers closer to 100 should reflect greater
similarity, numbers closer to 0 should reflect lesser similarity.

For each subject 40 pairs of mammals were individually randomly selected
with the sole constraints that (a) no identity pairs (e.g., zebra-zebra) be included; and (b) no two pairs of the form x-y and y-x be included. A given
subject’s 40 pairs were sequentially presented for rating on a computer terminal in randomized order. The mammals of a pair appeared on the same
line, the choice of left-most mammal being determined randomly. Subjects
worked at their own speed and could review and revise earlier ratings at any
time. The procedure typically lasted 30 minutes.
3.2 Results

We define the following
Given mammals
mi, Mk.
(2)

sim(mi,

mk)

=

function
$2
T$z,

’ Two additional
correctly
to at least
mental
interview.

sim

from pairs of mammals

I minimum

{M(i,

maximum

{M(i,

subjects
were excluded
from the
3 of 10 elementary
questions
about

j),
j),

M(k,
M(k,

experiment
mammals

to [0, 11.

j) }
j)}

because
they
administered

responded
inin a preexperi-
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The sim function (2) reduces to the sim function (1) of Section 1 if the association M(i, j) of propertyj to mammal i is conceived as consisting of “microfeatures” that sum toM(i, j); the greater the number of such microfeatures,
the greater the level of association. The minimum of {M(i, j), M(k, j)} may
then be conceived as the intersection of two sets of microfeatures, and the
maximum as their union. The intersection represents the commonality
of
mi. Mk, whereas the union is the sum of commonality
and distinctiveness.
[Distinctiveness is computed by

Definition (2) has three features that render it more appropriate to this
study than Tversky’s (1977) well-known contrast model of similarity, which
places commonality and distinctiveness in linear combination.
First, definition (2) ensures that similarities, like probabilities, are numbers in [0, 11. In
comparison, the contrast model allows similarities to be any number, positive or negative. Our attempt to derive probability from similarity will be
facilitated by the restricted range of the similarity function (2). Second,
definition (2) implies that for every mammal m;, sim(mi, m;)= 1, which
corresponds to the maximum informativeness of m; in inferences about mi.
In comparison, the contrast model allows sim (m;, mi) to be any positive real
number, and sim(mi, mi)#sim(mj,
mi) is possible for distinct mammals
mi, mj. There seems to be no fact about inference that corresponds to this
variability in self-similarity.
Finally, no free parameters appear in definition
(2), whereas three are required for the contrast model. The absence of parameters simplifies the evaluation of models in what follows.
For each of the 30 subjects we computed the Pearson correlation between
(a) the similarity values assigned by that subject to the 40 pairs of mammals
he or she evaluated, and (b) the values of sim for those same pairs, computed from (2). Note that sim values do not depend on any data from the
similarity subjects, because only the matrix M enters their calculation and
M was constructed from the data of the property-rating
task. As a consequence, between-subject variability in opinions about mammal features can
be expected to lower the correlation between observed similarity values and
predicted sim values. Nevertheless, the average of these 30 correlations is
.64 (p< .OOl, SD = .123). We interpret this result as supporting the psychological reality of the Mammal x Property matrix A4 as well as definition (2)
of similarity.*
4. PROBABILITY

TASK

The probability task consisted of a categorization procedure followed by a
judgment procedure. The purpose of the first procedure was to identify the
’ Because each subject received
sis using pooled data is possible.

an individually

randomized

set of pairs for rating,

no analy-
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superordinate categories that the subject recognizes among mammals.
These superordinates figured in the probability questions to which the subject responded in the’second procedure. Thirty new subjects completed the
probability task.’ Before describing the two procedures we discuss the
nature of the probability questions used.

4.1 Probability

Questions

Used

In the judgment procedure subjects
like those appearing in the following

4.1. I General Form of the Questions.

evaluated conditional
questions.

probabilities

(3) (a) What is the probability that horses require biotin for hemoglobin synthesis assuming that giraffes do?
(b) What is the probability that all canines use norepinephrine as a regulator of sexual drive assuming that wolves do and felines do not?
(c) What is the probability that all mammals can regulate their feeding
cycle in conditions of constant illumination assuming that bears can?

The statement “All canines use norepinephrine
as a regulator of sexual
drive” will be called the conclusion of question (3 b), whereas the succeeding statements about wolves and felines will be called premises, and similarly
for other questions. As illustrated in (3 b), some questions included negative
premises. Conclusions were always affirmative.
The premises and conclusion of a given question always invoke the same
predicate and have one of the following logical forms: (a) all members of
category X have property P, or (b) all members of category X do not have
property P. The predicates figuring in the questions, for example, “requires
biotin for hemoglobin synthesis,” may be termed blank inasmuch as subjects are unlikely to attach prior probabilities to conclusions involving such
properties. The use of blank predicates thus allows all relevant background
information to appear explicitly in the premises of a probability question.
This study is limited to blank predicates; extension to nonblank predicates is
briefly discussed in Section 6.2. Probability
questions will henceforth be
abbreviated by (a) omitting their predicates, (b) writing premises above conclusion with a separating line, and (c) indicating premise polarity by +- or
- . Thus, (3 b) is abbreviated to:
+ wolves
_ felines
canines

’ One additional
mental
test described
bizarre
superodinates

subject
was excluded
from the experiment
in Footnote
I. Another
additional
subject
(his data were not analyzed).

because
he failed
the preexperiwas dropped
because
of highly
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Question (3 b) illustrates the presence of superordinate categories likefeline
and canine among premises and conclusions. These superordinates do not
figure among our list of 48 mammals but rather include subsets of them.
Pilot studies revealed that superordinates recognized by M.I.T. undergraduates are variable in both name and membership. Consequently, with the
exception of mammal (assumed common to everyone), the superordinates
figuring in a given subject’s questions were drawn exclusively from the set
established in that subject’s categorization procedure.
A vast number of probability questions may be generated from the 48
mammals plus associated superordinates. Each subject responded to an
individually
randomly selected subset of questions that met certain criteria.
One criterion excluded defective questions; other criteria included questions
of suitable type. The next two subsections set forth these criteria.
4. I.2 Exclusion of Defective Questions. Three kinds of defective probability

questions are now defined. (The definitions are relative to the superordinate
categories established by a particular subject.) A question is contradictory
if
its premises cannot all be true. Suppose, for example, that both the superordinatesfeline and man-eating contain lion. Then question (4) is contradictory.
(4) + felines
-man-eaters
rhinos

A question is redundant if one of its premise categories includes another.
For example, (5) is redundant if canine is the standard category.
(5) + canines
f German shepards
rabbits

Similarly, { + /ion, + lion} is a redundant premise set.
A question is trivial if its premises logically imply its conclusion, or the
negation of its conclusion. For example, the following are trivial (assuming
that canine is the standard category).
(6) - collies
+ foxes
canines

+ canines
wolves

We also consider trivial any question whose conclusion is implied by its
premises under the assumption that our 48 instances exhaust the category
mammal. By this criterion (7) is trivial, if the union ofpredator andprey includes all 48 mammals.
(7) +predalors
+ Prey
mammals
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All probability questions posed to subjects were noncontradictory,
redundant, and nontrivial.

non-

4.1.3 Inclusion of Suitable Types. A premise or conclusion may be called
“specific” if its category is one of the 48 mammals of Table 1; it is “superordinate” if its category is defined by the subject as including at least 2 but
not all of the 48 mammals; and it is “general” if its category is mammal. We
distinguish four types of premises: either specific or superodinate, and either
affirmative or negative (general premises are excluded by nontriviality).
We
distinguish three types of conclusion, either specific, superordinate,
or
general (all conclusions are affirmative). Two probability questions are said
to be of the same type just in case (a) their conclusions are of the same type;
and (b) the number of premises of each type are equal across the two questions. For example, the following pairs of questions are of the same type:
+ bobcat
-canine

-feline
+ rat

seal

skunk

+ elephant

-lion

- sheep

t hamster

+ primate
canine

+ canine
feline

+ beaver

+ collie

mammal

mammal

A counting argument shows that there are exactly 47 types of questions
meeting the following conditions:
(8) (a) the question has 1, 2, or 3 premises;
(b) it has at least 1 positive premise; and
(c) it has at most one negative premise.
Any
tory,
bility
that

question of one of these 47 types-provided
that it is neither contradicredundant, nor trivial-was potentially available for use in the probatask. We now describe the categorization and probability procedures
constituted the task.

4.2 Categorization

Procedure

Subjects first read the following instructions:
This part of the experiment concerns your judgment about how to distribute
mammals into natural categories. Your task will be to create biologically meaningful groups, and then for each group to indicate which of the 48 mammals
belongs to it. It is permitted to leave a mammal uncategorized if there are no
other mammals in the list with which it forms a biologically natural group.
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Groups can be of any size, and it is permissible to have overlap of members
For each group, you will need to devise a short, descriptive label.
Categorization
was carried out on a computer terminal.
category names and indicated which mammals among the
in it. Review and revision of previous choices of category
bership was possible at any time. The superordinate name
not allowed. The categorization procedure lasted roughly
4.3 Judgment Procedure
Subjects first read the following

Subjects devised
48 were included
name and mem“mammal”
was
30 minutes.

instructions:

This part of the experiment concerns your judgment about the probability that
a category of mammals possesses a given, biological property. The properties
in question might involve any biologically meaningful aspect of mammals,
including their physiology, anatomy, diet, behavior, habitat, appearance, etc.

Examples of these properties are the following:
l
l
l
l
l

requires biotin for hemoglobin synthesis;
has sesamoid bones;
can regulate their feeding cycle in conditions of constant illumination;
blood salinity declines from infancy to maturity;
uses norepinephrine as a regulator of sexual drive.

Imagine that a biological property like one of these has recently come under
investigation. You know nothing about the property except that it is biological
in character, and called “f” for short. You will be asked to judge the probability that one kind of mammal has property P, assumingit to be known that
other kinds of mammalsdo-or do not-have P.
Forty-seven probability questions were then randomly generated for each
subject. The superordinates appearing in the questions were drawn from the
list established by the same subject in the preceding categorization procedure. Each question exemplified a distinct type from the set of 47 types
satisfying (8). No question was either contradictory, redundant, or trivial.
Within these constraints, the mammals and superordinates appearing in a
given question were chosen randomly for each subject individually.
For
multiple-premise
questions, the order of premises was determined randomly.
The order in which a given subject’s 47 questions were presented for evaluation was also determined randomly.
The judgment procedure was carried out on a computer terminal. Questions appeared in the form exemplified by (9).
(9) Given that:
(1) Rats have the property P,
(2) no canineshave the property f,
(3) felineshave the property P,

what is the probability (O-100%) that all primates have the property P?
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After responding to the 47 questions, subjects reviewed their answers and
could revise any of them.
5. RESULTS

OF THE PROBABILITY

TASK

5.1 Global Statistics

The average number of superordinates generated by the 30 subjects in the
categorization procedure was 11.4 (SD= 3.49), with a minimum of 5 and a
maximum of 20. Over all 30 subjects, the average number of mammals included in a given superordinate was 5.8 (SD = 4.66). The average probability
assigned by a given subject in the judgment procedure ranges from .220 to
.620. Over all subjects, the mean of these averages is .477 (SD= .118).
5.2 Assessing

Default

Reasoning

Models:

General Remarks

We now consider several models for predicting the probabilities assigned by
an individual subject. All the models are assessed as follows. One question
is selected from the 47 evaluated by a given subject. It is the probability
assigned to this “target” question that must be predicted. The prediction is
generated by whatever computation is prescribed by the model at issue. This
computation may use as input no more than: (a) the subject’s answers to the
46 remaining questions; (b) information about membership in the subject’s
superordinate categories (as established in the categorization procedure for
that subject); and (c) the Mammal x Property matrix M established in the
property-rating task. The absolute difference between predicted and assigned
probabilities for the target is determined. A new target question is then
selected and the remaining 46 questions (including the old target question)
are used to generate a prediction about the new target. This procedure is
repeated for all 47 possible target questions. The performance of the model
for the given subject is measured by the average, absolute deviation over all
47 questions between predicted and assigned probabilities. This average is
called the discrepancy for the chosen subject. We seek a model that minimizes the average discrepancy across all 30 subjects.
5.3 An Actuarial

Model

In order to establish baseline performance for comparison with other models,
an actuarial model for generating default probabilities was assessed. To
predict the probability assigned by the subject to the target question we used
the average probability assigned by that subject to the remaining 46 questions. The average discrepancy for this model across all 30 subjects is .191
(SD = .047).’
‘ Because
each of the 47 questions
that a subject
answered
was of unique
type (in the sense
of Section
4.1.3).
it is not possible
to predict
a target
question
by averaging
over the subset
of
remaining
questions
of the same type.
Such an averaging
scheme
might
be the best actuarial
model
in a context
where
multiple
questions
of the same type were evaluated
by a single subject.
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5.4 A Similarity Model
Our similarity model was briefly discussed in Section 1, and may be described
as follows. Let a target question Q be given. We first determine the similarity
of Q’s positive premises to its conclusion as well as the similarity of Q’s
negative premises to its conclusion. The probability assigned to Q is taken
to be a linear combination of these latter two similarities. The coefficients
of the linear combination
are derived by regression over the remaining 46
questions. We now describe this procedure precisely.
The sim function of definition (2) applies to pairs of mammals. To implement our model of probability judgment we must extend sim to a function
SIh4 defined on pairs X, Y of subsets of mammals. Intuitively,
SIM(X, Y)
measures the extent to which X “covers” Y, specifically, the extent to which
every member of Y is near to some member of X. SIM is defined as follows.
(10) Let X, Y be subsets of mammals, and lety be a particular mammal.

(a) S1M(X,y) = muximum{sim(x,y) ] xEX};
(b) SIM(X, Y)=mean{SIM(X,y)
1yE Y}.
Thus, SIM(X,y) is the maximum similarity of a member of X toy, and may
be termed “the similarity of X to y. ” SIM(X, Y) is the average similarity of
X to members of Y. [Note that SZM(X, Y) need not equal SIM(Y,X).]
As a means of predicting our subjects’ assigned probabilities,
SIM has
some noteworthy properties. Three of these are now discussed, Let Q be a
probability question whose premises are positive and specific, and whose
conclusion is superordinate. Let X = xi . . .xn be the mammals figuring in the
premises, and let Y=yi . . .ym be the mammals included in the conclusion
category.
1. SIM(X, Y) is monotone in n, as easily seen. Likewise, the probability
that subjects actually assign to Q usually does not decline with expansion of the premise set X. Exceptions to this generalization are documented in Osherson et al. (1990) under the term “nonmonotonicity.”
The exceptions are rare enough, however, to warrant the monotonicity
of szA4.
2. SIMis not monotone in m; The mean operator in (10 b) allows SIM (X, Y)
either to increase or decrease as Y is expanded. Normatively,
we expect
the probability of Q to decline monotonically
with increasing m. But
subjects often violate this principle when faced with questions like the
following, judging the first to be more likely than the second.
+ mouse

+ mouse

mammal

hippo

This pattern of judgment is documented in Osherson et al. (1990) under
the term “inclusion
fallacy.” In contrast to nonmonotonicity
with
respect to premises, the inclusion fallacy is prevalent in ordinary reasoning (see Shafir, Smith, & Osherson, in press). The use of mean in (10 b)
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is a simple mechanism for representing this feature of naive judgment.
For example, SIM( { mouse}, mammal)> SZM( { mouse}, {hippo}), because almost all mammals resemble mice more than hippos do.’
3. SIM conforms to the “diversity effect,” namely, the tendency for the
probability assigned to Q to rise as the average similarity between members of X declines. This effect is documented in Osherson et al. (1990);
it has also been discussed by philosophers of science (e.g., Horwich,
1982). I’t is easy to see that SZM(X, Y) also tends to rise with the diversity
of X (because of the maximum operator in (10 a). For further discussion of these and other properties of SIM, see Osherson et al. (1990).
We now describe our similarity model for generating default probabilities
for a given subject. The model first associates a positive similarity factor
and a negative similarity factor with each of the subject’s 47 questions. For
each question Q, these factors are calculated in the following three steps.
Step 1: Segregate the affirmative and negative premises of Q so as to
form two subquestions, denoted Q’ and Q-. For example, if Q is:
(11) +0x
- canine

+feline
seagoing

then Q+ and Q- are as follows:
(12) +0x

+feline
____
~-canine
seagoing seagoing

If Q contains no negative premises, then Q- is null. (By (8 b), Q has at least
one positive premise.)
Step 2: “Explode” Q’ and Q- by replacing superordinate categories
with their members (according to the subject’s categorization data). Thus,
assuming natural memberships for feline, canine and seagoing, Q+ and Q from (12) become:
(13) +0x

+ bobcar
+ leopard
+ lion
+ persiancat

- chihuohua
- collie
- dalmatian
-fox

’ It is easy to see that use of minimum
in (10 b) rather than freon would block the inclusion
fallacy, and hence, is more normatively
acceptable.
Thus, in modeling
the probability
judgment of experts instead of undergraduates,
a model based on minimum
would presumably
be
more descriptively
accurate than one based on mean.
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- germanshepard
- wolf
bluewhale
humpback whale
killer whale
seal
walrus

Q- remains null if Q contains no negative premises. If Q’s conclusion is
general (i.e., contains mammal) than all 48 mammals appear in the conclusion set of its exploded arguments. If a premise or conclusion is specific,
then explosion does not affect it.
Step 3: Calculate SZM(X+,C) where Xi is theset of mammals appearing
in Q+ ‘s exploded premises, and C is the set of mammals appearing in Q + ‘s
conclusion. Zf Q- is not null, calculate SZM(X-,C)
in the samefashion.
Q’s positive similarity factor is SZM(X+,C) from Step 3. If Q- is null,

then Q’s negative similarity factor is defined to be zero; otherwise, it is
We let Qpos be Q’s positive similarity factor and Qnes be Q’s
negative similarity factor. It is expected, of course, that QPoS vary directly
with the judged probability of Q and that Qnes vary inversely.
Finally, given target question Q and remaining questions Qi (is 46), this
model assigns a default probability to Q in the following manner. Using
standard techniques from the theory of linear regression, real coefficients a,
P, y are found such that

SZM(X-,C).

(14) i;,

(aQ?

+

bQyg

+ Y - i);)*

is minimized, where Qi is the probability
probability predicted for Q is then:

assigned by the subject to Qi. The

(15) crQJ”= + fiQneg + y

The average discrepancy (in the sense of Section 5.2) for this model across
all 30 subjects is .I52 (SD= .041).” A t test for related measures shows this
performance to be significantly superior to that of the actuarial model of
Section 5.3 (t = 9.09, p< .OOl). The discrepancy for 29 of the 30 subjects
was lower using the similarity model than using the actuarial model.
A related analysis of the similarity model was carried out as follows. For
each subject we calculated the multiple correlation between the probability
assigned to a given question Q and the values of QPoS and Q”es for that
6 It is possible for (15) to fall outside the interval (0, I]. However, this occurs so seldomly
that no truncation step was employed to convert negative values to 0 or values greater than 1 to
I. We note as well that in virtually every case, a turned out to be positive and p turned out to be
negative, as expected.
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question as given in Step 3 above. Thus, for each of the 30 correlations (1
per subject), N= 47, which is the number of questions randomly generated
for each subject. The average of these 30 correlations is .60 (SD = .124). The
mean value of the regression coefficient for QPoS was .93; for Qneg it was
- .25. The discrepancy in absolute value suggests that subjects paid more
attention to positive than to negative premises.’
As before, it is well to note that the predictions of the similarity model
rest heavily on the data of the subjects who rated mammal properties. Specifically, the calculation of Qpos and Q neg for a given question Q depends
only on the superordinate categories elicited from the subject in question
plus the matrix M used to calculate G/n. As a consequence, between-subject
variability in opinions about mammal properties can only depress the fit of
the similarity model to the data of the probability task.
5.5 A Pure Category

Model

To gauge the role of similarity per se in the accuracy of the similarity model,
we devised a rival model that exploits information about superordinate categories provided by each subject in the probability task, but does not depend
on similarity. Thus, the rival model uses only data provided by the subject
being modeled, because no recourse is made to sim and the matrix M upon
which it is based.
Given question Q, let Q prem denote the number of premises in the exploded version of Q+ minus the number of premises in the exploded version
of Q-. Let QCO”’ denote the number of conclusions in the exploded version
of Q+ or Q-. Thus, Qprem measures the weight of evidence in favor of Q’s
conclusion, whereas Qconc measures the generality of that conclusion. Qprent
and Qconc are based entirely on a given subject’s category information; similarity does not intervene.
Our category model is the same as the similarity model except that Qprem
and Q’*“’ are used in place of QPDSand Q”eg respectively.’ The average discrepancy for this model across all 30 subjects is .179 (SD = .044). A t test for
related measures shows this performance to be significantly superior to that
of the actuarial model (t = 3.57, p < .Ol), but significantly worse than that of
the similarity model (t= 7.61, p< .OOl). The discrepancy for 27 of the 30
subjects was lower using the similarity model than using the pure category
model.
5.6 Other Models

We have tried other methods for generating default probabilities, but they
either work less well than the similarity model or are more complicated and
work no better. The variations that were investigated include the following:
’ Because
each subject
received
an
analysis
is possible
using pooled
data.
’ Truncation
in the sense of Footnote

individually
6 was

randomized
employed

sample
to limit

of 47 arguments,

predictions

to [0,

no
I].
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1. Substitution of a linear similarity function for definition (2) of sim;
2. Differential weighting of common and distinctive properties in calculating sim;
3. Enhanced weighting of properties that are shared by several premises in
calculating similarity;
4. Replacement of maximum by sum in (10 a) and replacement of mean by
either minimum or maximum in (10 b); and
5. Averaging techniques of various sorts in order to create “prototype vectors” from positive premises, negative premises, and conclusions.
The foregoing variations

were also tried in combinations.
6. DISCUSSION

This investigation is preliminary
in two respects. First, the experimental
procedure limits the accuracy that can be expected of any model of default
probability.
Second, blank rather than interpretable predicates figured in
the probability questions. These topics are now discussed in turn.
6.1 Limits

on Accuracy

in This Study

6.1. I Division of Tasks. One set of subjects constructed the Mammal x
Property matrix M and a different set of subjects responded to probability
questions. This circumstance allows between-subject variability in knowledge about mammals to interfere with predictions of probability judgment.
In an application of the similarity model for purposes of generating default
probabilities automatically,
information about objects and properties would
be based on judgments made by the same person whose probabilities are to
be predicted.
6.1.2 Limited Number of Mammals. Only 48 mammals figured in this
study. As a result, categories like canine are likely to include members (e.g.,
poodle) that fall outside the 48 mammals that subjects categorized. The
exploded arguments generated in Step 2 of Section 5.4 are, therefore, imperfect representations of questions involving categorical premises and conclusions. A more comprehensive set of instances is likely to arise in a realistic
setting. Similarly, realistic databases might code information about property
variability (see Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983; Rips, 1989) and
about the typicality of instances; these are potentially useful variables in
similarity calculations.
6. I. 3 Number of Predictive Variables. Only two variables-namely,
positive and negative factors of similarity-appear
in the predicting formula
(15) of Section 5.4. Other variables might be linearly combined with these
two in the hope of increasing predictive accuracy beyond the .152 average

OSHERSON,

268

STERN,

WILKIE,

STOB.

AND

SMITH

discrepancy achieved. In particular, the theory of category-based induction
advanced in Osherson et al. (1990) posits additional variables related to the
superordinate categories that subjects recognize among mammals.
It is usually self-defeating, however, to incorporate additional variables
into (15) because of the limited number of probability questions evaluated
by each subject. For practical reasons, and in order to avoid stereotypical
responding,, each subject in the judgment procedure responded to only 47
questions. As a consequence, our attempts to add additional predictive
variables were foiled by the emergence of ad hoc solutions to the regression
equations based on 46 items. Use of these solutions to predict the probability
assigned to target questions results in greater average discrepancy than
obtained with just two variables, or else yields little improvement
at the
expense of a more complicated method.
In a more realistic setting, a larger number of judgments would be available, so extrapolation to a new probability can be based on methods incorporating more variables. Nonlinear use of these variables might also be
worthwhile.
6.1.4 Minimization of Absolute Differences. The regression analysis used
to fix the parameters (Y, /3, and y in (15) minimizes the squared deviation
(14). In contrast, it is more natural to define average discrepancy in terms of
absolute deviation, as we have done. The average discrepancy of the similarity method could thus be further reduced by minimizing
(16)

;z, 1CXQP” + /3Qfeg + y - 6; 1

rather than (14) when fixing (Y, /3, and y. Minimization
of absolute differences is computationally difficult, which is why familiar regression techniques
were employed here. However, we have employed numerical techniques to
estimate values of CY,0, y that minimize (16). Using these estimates, the
average discrepancy of the similarity model is diminished by nearly 10%.
6.2 Nonblank

Predicates

Extension of our results to probability questions with meaningful predicates
is nontrivial because interactions can arise between a property explicitly
ascribed to a given object and other properties it possesses (cf., Murphy &
Medin, 1985). An initial approach to meaningful predicates is to limit them
to properties already represented explicitly in prestored information
about
instances (e.g., size, habitat, color, etc. in this study). Attribution of such a
property to an instance would change or confirm the value of the property
initially represented for that instance. To reflect the greater importance of
an explicitly attributed property, its weight in similarity calculations would
be increased. A similar technique yielded positive results in a study of typi-
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cality and conceptual combination
(see Smith, Osherson, Rips, & Keane,
1988). Stern (1991) applies mechanisms of this character to modeling default
probability in the context of meaningful predicates.
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